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October 1, 2003 
The strategic push by the Bush administration to use preemptive and preventive measures to counter the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has met with criticism since the release of the National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2002. Using preventive strikes within a 
counterproliferation policy cannot make the proliferation threat go away, but it can slow nuclear weapons 
development programs. Whether or not a preventive strike is launched, however, depends on the 
availability of credible intelligence; a determination that the benefits of taking action outweigh the costs of 
a preventive strike; and the belief that the long-term political consequences of a preventive strike can be 
managed. Those ideal conditions often occur when leaders identify an immediate direct threat against a 
state's vital interests. The Israeli strike on the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak in 1981, and the Johnson 
administration's consideration of preventive strikes against China's Lop Nur nuclear plant in 1963 offer 
insight into the way policymakers use force as part of a counterproliferation policy.  
Israel's Attack on Osirak 
Contrary to what is typically written about the Israeli air strike on the Osirak reactor in Iraq, the mission 
was not preemptive, but preventive. Iraq was far from reaching nuclear weapons capability at the time of 
attack. The attack was controversial because it was the first occasion where a state engaged in a 
preventive action against another state's nuclear program without any immediate provocation. Israeli 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin issued the order to attack because he feared that his party would lose 
the next election, and he did not believe the opposition had the fortitude to destroy the Iraqi nuclear 
weapons infrastructure before it produced a bomb.  
Iraq ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 29 October 1969, pledged not to manufacture nuclear 
weapons, and agreed to place all its nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA safeguards.[1] Saddam 
Hussein, while Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, initiated the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program in the 1970s.[2] Iraq purchased a reactor from France in 1975 with the intent to use it for civil 
power purposes, but the acquisition of highly enriched uranium in the program generated international 
concern. The worst fears of the international community were realized when after an attack by Iran in the 
early days of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, the official Iraqi news agency issued the following 
statement: "The Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not intended to be used 
against Iran, but against the Zionist entity."[3] This single statement indicated not only that Iraq was 
pursuing a nuclear bomb, but also that Israel would be the primary the target of Iraq's nascent nuclear 
arsenal.  
On 7 June 1981 Israel took preventive action against the Iraqi nuclear program by conducting a surprise 
attack on the Osirak reactor. Before the decision to strike was made, Israeli officials debated the timing of 
the attack, and a dispute over whether the problem should be resolved by military or diplomatic action 
ensued between the two major Israeli parties. The Labor party favored diplomatic efforts. It adopted a 
"wait and see" policy that relied upon diplomacy to try to forestall the Iraq effort. In 1981, Labor leaders 
believed an understanding with then French President Francois Mitterand had been reached that 
reversed the French policy of assisting Iraq's nuclear program. Prime Minister Begin, leader of the Likud 
Party, disagreed with this approach. He did not trust leaving this matter to the French, to fate, and 
certainly not to the reasonableness of Saddam Hussein. He thought military action was the only remedy 
to a nascent Iraqi nuclear threat. 
Once Begin issued the strike order, timing became the next item of concern. Major General David Ivry, 
then Chief of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), maintained that "we have to attack before uranium was going to 
get to the facility, because otherwise, after attacking with uranium inside, it can cause radiation damage 
to the environment."[4] Israeli officials were concerned about the potential of nuclear fallout from the 
destruction of the reactor reaching populated areas of Iraq. The Israeli intelligence community 
recommended canceling the operation hours before the strike was to commence out of fear that it would 
disrupt Israeli peace negotiations with Egypt.[5] Begin ignored this recommendation and ordered the 
attack to proceed. On 7 July 1981 at 5:35pm, eight F-16s dropped sixteen tons of explosives on the 
Osirak reactor.[6]  
 
  
Shown at the left is the view from an 
Israeli F-16 as it targeted the Iraqi 
nuclear reactor. The attack is thought by 
some to have delayed the Iraqi nuclear 
program by over a decade. Others, 
however, suggest that the reactor's 
destruction speeded up Iraq's program 
and helped spur Saddam to create the 
industrial-scale type effort that was 
uncovered by UN inspectors after Gulf 
War I. 
The destruction of the Osirak reactor greatly affected Iraq's nuclear program. Although the attack took 
Iraq off the fast track to nuclear weapons, Baghdad responded furiously by doubling its efforts to obtain 
the bomb. It assigned 20,000 people to work on the nuclear program and accelerated development of gas 
centrifuges to produce bomb-grade material. Iraq spent over $10 billion on prohibited components and its 
denial and deception methods to conceal related facilities and technologies.[7]  
While the United States publicly denounced the Israeli assault, it was criticized for its tertiary involvement 
in the attack. The Israelis used U.S. manufactured equipment as a delivery system for the operation, and 
the United States provided intelligence support to the Israelis before and after the attack. The F-16s were 
sold to Israel for defensive purposes only and their use in an offensive, unprovoked attack constituted a 
violation of the United States Arms Export Control Act.[8] The U.S. Congress reviewed a report citing the 
violation, but little was done in response to its findings. The United States, although embarrassed by 
Israel's violation, maintained its support for Israel despite the protests made by Iraq and other Arab 
states.[9] Intelligence support was forthcoming from the United States following a secret agreement 
initiated by Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey, with the Israelis in which Tel Aviv promised 
not to challenge the U.S. sale of the Airborne Warning Control Systems (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia in 
exchange for target information on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor outside of Baghdad.[10] It was later 
discovered that the intelligence information far exceeded the requirements of the raid and that Israel drew 
material from U.S. intelligence sources on Libya and Pakistan. In response, the U.S. intelligence 
community imposed a limit on satellite information shared with Israel to extend only 250 miles beyond its 
borders. 
The destruction of the Osirak reactor proved detrimental to Iraq's nuclear program, and the Israelis 
maintained that it deferred Baghdad's nuclear technology and material acquisition for a decade. Former 
United Nations chief nuclear weapons inspector David A. Kay estimated that if Iraq had been left 
undisturbed, it could have acquired a nuclear bomb by 1992.[11] The Israelis believed that the Iraqi 
nuclear program was a risk to Israel's national security and acted accordingly to protect their sovereignty. 
U.S. tertiary involvement in the strike led to greater tensions in U.S.-Iraqi relations. It is quite possible that 
if the Iraqis had gained nuclear weapons, they would have launched an even more aggressive policy. 
Preventive action worked in that it helped prevent Iraq from obtaining nuclear weapons, but not without 
cost in terms of U.S. relations with Arab states.  
China's Nuclear Program and the U.S. Response 
China detonated its first nuclear device on 20 October 1964. The fact that China conducted the test 
earlier than the United States expected left the Johnson administration wondering how to address the 
new Chinese nuclear threat. Months earlier, however, interest in preemptive strikes against the Chinese 
nuclear program increased in the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Declassified 
documents released in the mid-1990s revealed that a U.S. preemptive attack on China's nuclear plants 
was considered as a possible operation to disrupt the Chinese program.  
There was a great deal of secrecy surrounding the Chinese nuclear program and the U.S. intelligence 
community had few collection capabilities available to target the Chinese program. The first 
reconnaissance satellites were launched in August 1960, but the first valuable photographs of the 
Chinese nuclear program were not taken before 1961, after the Chinese program was well underway.[12] 
Additionally, U.S. intelligence falsely estimated that the Chinese used plutonium, not uranium, in their 
nuclear research, which resulted in severe miscalculations by U.S. analysts in estimating when a usable 
device would be ready for testing.[13]  
Further inaccurate estimates regarding Chinese nuclear technology resulted when analysts used the 
timelines maintained by the United States and Soviet Union for their respective nuclear programs. Due to 
the failure of intelligence to collect and analyze information about the Chinese nuclear program, President 
Johnson and his advisors were forced to make a decision with very limited knowledge of the situation. 
In April 1965, as the Chinese nuclear program got closer to fielding a testable device, Special Assistant to 
the President W.W. Rostow issued a memorandum that addressed possible U.S. actions regarding the 
Chinese nuclear threat. He stated that preemptive action "would be undesirable except as part of a 
military action against the mainland in response to major ChiCom [Chinese Communist] aggression. 
Prospects for covert action should receive continued examination."[14] The memo discussed what military 
posture the United States should take in Asia in its entirety, and concluded that the U.S. "posture should 
combine an implicit nuclear threat and a visible ability to deal conventionally with Communist 
aggression."[15] Maintaining a strong stance within Asia in its entirety was more important than 
specifically dealing with the Chinese nuclear threat.  
By mid-September 1964, six weeks before the Chinese test, McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor 
to President Johnson, issued a memo declaring that "we are not in favor of unprovoked unilateral U.S. 
military action against Chinese nuclear installations at this time. We would prefer to have a Chinese test 
take place than to initiate such action now." Bundy also stated that there was interest in pursuing a 
combined action with the Soviet Union against the Chinese nuclear threat. He thought that warnings 
issued jointly by the United States and Soviet Union would be useful and that "even a possible agreement 
to cooperate in preventive military action" would be a viable option if the Soviets were interested. The final 
determination on the matter was that further attempts to gather information regarding the Chinese nuclear 
facilities should be done in an aircraft with Chinese Nationalist (Taiwanese) markings and pilots to hide 
U.S. involvement in the reconnaissance effort. President Johnson approved this course of action and the 
issue of preventive strikes against the Chinese faded from the policy agenda.[16] Earlier studies 
estimated that Soviet cooperation was improbable, and that since the "United States had not identified all 
of the relevant targets, an unprovoked attack would entail heavy foreign policy costs."[17] The Chinese 
threat could not "justify … actions which would involve great political costs or high military risks."[18]  
The official Chinese announcement after the detonation 16 October 1964 stated that it was "a major 
achievement" and China's struggle to strengthen its defenses was needed to "oppose the U.S. imperialist 
policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats."[19] While the White House's calmly reacted to the 
nuclear test, a debate continued over whether or not preventive strikes were the correct course of action. 
 
At left is an overhead shot of the Lop Nur test 
site in October 1964. The U.S. gave serious 
consideration to destroying the site before 
China's successful test in October 1964. 
A commentary issued after the explosion by George W. Rathjens, an official with the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, revealed that the major flaw of the inaction strategy was the failure of intelligence 
to properly identify key targets and to estimate the level of Chinese technology capabilities accurately. "In 
the light of reactions to the Chinese nuclear tests … it would appear that the political effects of the 
attainment of Chinese nuclear capabilities may also have been underestimated … further consideration of 
direct action against Chinese nuclear facilities may be warranted."[20]  
Attempting preventive strikes against the Chinese nuclear program in 1964 could have slowed Beijing's 
nuclear program, but there was no guarantee that such action would completely destroy the ambitions of 
Mao Zedong and his regime to build a nuclear weapon. Preemptive action would have required total 
destruction of all facilities and all personnel associated with the program and the Johnson administration 
deemed it would be too costly and most likely unsuccessful. With the need to contain the Soviet Union 
and the expanding war in Vietnam, targeting the Chinese nuclear program was not a top priority in 1964. 
Conclusion  
Israeli officials believed that their national security required a preventive strike on Iraq's nuclear program 
as a necessary mission to protect their sovereignty, whereas U.S. officials believed that the 
consequences of striking China were costly without holding out the promise of destroying the Chinese 
nuclear program. In the case of Israel and Osirak, the threat posed by Iraq was perceived to be extremely 
high, while the opportunity to cripple the Iraqi nuclear program appeared within reach. In the case of the 
United States and China in the 1960s, the development of a Chinese nuclear capability was perceived to 
be threatening, but no easy way was identified to cripple the Chinese nuclear program.  
Preventive strikes might be an effective course of action against states, such as North Korea and Iran, 
who have ignored international agreements and pursued their respective nuclear, chemical, and 
biological programs. Preventive military action will remain an option in U.S. counterproliferation strategy, 
but two necessary conditions have to be met before such attacks will take place. First, policymakers will 
have to see the threat of allowing current trends and programs to continue as worse than the problems 
that would follow in the aftermath of a preventive attack. Second, destruction of identified targets has to 
hold out the prospect of slowing or temporarily curtailing the rogue state's efforts to obtain weapons of 
mass destruction. As the previous comparison of the decisions made by U.S. and Israeli officials 
suggests, these circumstances are not always present when policymakers contemplate preventive action 
to stop another state from acquiring nuclear weapons.  
 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East and WMD Proliferation & Counterproliferation 
Resources. 
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